Abstract This article provides a single case study of a British organised crime network operational from the late-1980s to 1996. The network centred around three security firms which spanned the 'spectrum of legitimacy' by legally providing security for licensed venues, whilst taxing and protecting drug dealers, and/or selling drugs in the nightclubs they protected. All three firms employed violence to prevent the encroachment of competitors and extort licensed businesses. Debt collection services were also used as a front for extortion.
Introduction
This paper adds to the sparse literature of the activities of British organised crime 1 by detailing a single case study of a network centred on three legitimate security companies
By controlling club doors we could control who was running the drugs inside and we made dealers cough up £1,000 a time to operate in the top places (see also O'Mahoney 2009; also Thompson 2000) . 3 After paying the tax the doorstaff prevented competing drug dealers from entering the nightclub and alerted approved dealers to police presence . Leach (2003: 56) recalls how:
…the whole firm, had all gone up to Suffolk by car to sort out a problem at one of the clubs where Tony [Tucker] handled the security where some local dealers were serving up [selling] drugs which were not "approved" by
Tony. The manager asked Tony to get up a heavy team to sort it. We got up two car loads, about eight of us altogether…, and we planned to arrive by surprise, lock up the back doors of the club and trap the dealers inside.
An important element of this quote is how the nightclubs manager requested Tuckers support in removing the non-approved dealer. Similarly, the manager of a major London club asked Leach to remove dealers as the nightclub had 'a couple of our own people' selling drugs (Leach 2003: 80 O'Mahoney, similarly, stated in Norwich Crown Court that the owner of the nightclub he provided security for permitted drug dealing (Horsnell 1996; Independent 1996; also Watkins 1996) .
Windle, J., 2013. Tuckers firm: a case study of British organised crime. Trends in Organized Crime, 16(4) , pp.382-396. Pre-print copy.
8
The consumption of certain illicit drugs was central to the atmosphere of the dance clubs and illegal raves of the 1980s/1990s (Hobbs et al. 2003; Ward 2010) . Leach and O'Mahoney's accounts validate the findings of ethnographic studies which suggested that, as some venues were dependent upon drugs for financial success, 'management systems were complicit in the existence of drugs trade and supply on their premises' (Ward 2010: 156; also Sanders 2005) .
In some respects, such nightclubs became open drug markets (Ward 2010) . Although as customers often had to be proactive in finding concealed dealers, the market was seldom overt (Measham et al. 2001 ). To prevent other dealers selling in their clubs, the doorstaff would:
… recruit people who weren't actually willing to sell drugs. They would be told: "Here's twenty pounds, you go into the club and see if you can buy ecstasy or any other drug off anyone. As soon as you find someone selling, buy it off them, come back to us and point them out; we'll take them to the fire exit, spin them, take all their money and take all their drugs" …//… Our In one example, Ellis witnessed Tucker at a rave:
As soon as he spotted a drug dealer not on his payroll Tucker grabbed him by the throat, slapped his face, stole his cash and drugs … I am aware of at least four drug dealers he robbed in a similar manner that day (Ellis 2009:
As well as facilitating drug dealing, a police statement following the death of Tucker, Tate and Rolfe described how they sold a variety of drugs 'wholesale rather than retail' (Bennett 1995: 4) . Leach (2003: 183) 
refers to Tucker as a 'major drug-dealer' and Ellis witnessed
Tucker distributing packets of Ecstasy pills to floor dealers at an illegal rave (Ellis 2009). Once in the country, the drugs were divided between the investors. Shares were depended upon the amount originally invested. Rolfe, for example, sold his share of imported cannabis to a North London drug dealer, while one of the smugglers (Nicholls) sold his share in smaller packages to dealers in Cambridge, Essex and London (Thompson 2000) .
Another illicit activity connected to security was the use of violence to prevent the encroachment of competitors and prevent disturbances within the venue they were protecting. While a certain level of violence may have been necessary to prevent staff and customers from being injured, a number of studies have found that aggressive doorstaff promote aggression (Roberts 2008; see Homel and Clark 1994; Homel et al. 1992; Winlow 2001) . As such, a reduction in aggression may have been more effectively, and legally, reduced by designing out opportunities for conflict and provocation (see Graham and Homel 2008) .
Both Leach and O'Mahoney suggest that 'respect' was established by developing the firm's violent reputation (see Hobbs 1995; Winlow 2001) . As signs of perceived weakness may be seen as an invitation to competitors (Winlow 2001 ) the development of a violent reputation may be more instrumental in reducing the encroachment of competing security and drug dealing firms (see Bourgois 1995; Sanders 2005 ) than preventing disturbances. That is, as in legitimate businesses, 'a good reputation attracts customers and keeps competitors at bay' (Gambetta 1993: 44 (Thompson 2000) .
Conclusion
This paper has used a single case study to provide some insight into British organised crime during the 1990s. The single case study supports previous research into the linkages between organised crime and doorstaff whilst going further than other accounts by investigating other illicit activities undertaken by the professional criminals who ran legitimate private security firms.
The activities of Tuckers Firm spanned the spectrum of legitimacy. That is, members of Tuckers Firm used illegitimate means to further profits of legitimate businesses they owned, or worked for, whilst also making profit from purely illegal activity unconnected to legitimate business. Several activities, especially debt collection clustered 'at the margin of legitimacy' (Smith 1980: 382) .
It is also apparent from the three (auto)biographical narratives that several activities possessed a dual function, especially robber, violence and unlawful influence. These activities were used to achieve immediate and tangible goals, such as material gain, the avoidance of prosecution, the prevention of disturbances within 'their' nightclubs and the encroachment of competing security firms. Such activities were additionally used to achieve more distant, and abstract, goals of creating, maintaining or increasing the violent reputations upon which successful criminal enterprises are founded.
